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THE END OF AN EXPERIMENT IN FEDERALISM-
A NOTE ON MAPP v. OHIO
ARVAL MORRIS*
When one views the full panoply of constitutional rights from the
perspective of total United States Supreme Court history, he soon be-
comes aware that relatively few cases have directed that Court's
attention to the constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches
and seizures.' However, the right expressed by the fourth amendment2
is obviously one of the most fundamental' for it gives legal protection
to the "right of a man to privacy in his home, a right which is one of the
indispensable ultimate essentials of our concept of civilization."' Since
this right is "basic to a free society"' and "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty,"' one might be led to think that the cases presenting it
would be easily solved. Little could be farther from the truth.
Many factors account for this state of affairs, but surely one reason
* Professor of Law, University of Washington.1 This is not to say that the Court has failed to concern itself with civil liberty issues.
Quite the contrary, during the 1960 term the Court wrote 120 opinions, and 54 of them
were concerned with civil liberties. Compare this to the 1935 term when the Court
wrote 160 decisions, two of which were in this area. See, COMMISSION ON LAW AND
SOCIAL ACTION OF AMERICAN JEwISH CONGRESS, Civi. RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
DECISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SuPREmE CouRT (1961). This concern does not
necessarily mean civil liberties have been protected. As one writer summarized the
1956 term: "The general attitude toward the Court has been that it took an overly
protective attitude toward individual liberty. The trouble with the present Court,
however, is that it has not protected individual liberty enough; the fact is that it has
protected individual liberty too little." Keeffe, Comments on the Supreme Court'.s
Treatment of the Bill of Rights in the October 1956 Term, 26 FORDHAM L. REv. 468
(1957).
2 "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrants shall
issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly de-
scribing the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized." U.S. CONST.,
amend. IV.
3 See, Joshua 7:10-26; Genesis 19:4-11; Deuteronomy 24:10; Exodus 22:2,3; LAS-
SON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FoURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED
STATES CoNSTITUTION (1937) ; DOUGLAS, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE, 144-57 (1958);
15 HANSARD, PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND (1753-65).
-Prettyman, J., in District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13, 16, aff'd on other
grounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1950).5 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949). What is the right to privacy? "The
right of privacy, in essence, is anti-social. It is the right of an individual to live a life
of seclusion and anonymity, free from the prying curiosity which accompanies both
fame and notoriety. It presupposes a desire to withdraw from the public gaze, to be
free from the insatiable interest of the great mass of men in one who has risen above---
or fallen below-the mean. It is a recognition of the dignity of solitude.., of the sacred
and inviolate nature of one's innermost self." Nizer, The Right to Privacy: A Half
Century's Development, 39 MICH. L. REV. 526, 528 (1941).6 Wolf v. Colorado, supra note 5, at 27. See also, Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 325 (1937).
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is that court protection of so basic a right often occurs in a case where
the right is claimed by dubious characters, and its vindication tends to
appear brutally indifferent to the just desserts of those who invoke pro-
tection from an unreasonable search and seizure.7 Yet, Supreme Court
decisions reach well beyond the petty thief or common criminal and
establish principles which imply future applications for all. Decisions
and opinions must be fashioned from this broader perspective.8 A sec-
ond reason, contributing much heat and little light, is that protection of
the constitutional right frequently runs counter to demands of police
and other law enforcement officials.9 Their practices of gathering evi-
dence recurringly result in serious breaches of the guarantee." These
factors culminate in a hotly debated case, both in court and out. Amid
cries of "basic freedoms!" and "shall we shackle the police?" the Court
must chart its course under the fourth amendment. The path is not an
easy one; and, ultimately, Court decisions probably turn "on whether
one gives that amendment a place second to none in the Bill of Rights,
or considers it on the whole a kind of nuisance, a serious impediment in
the war against crime.""
The tensions mounting on all sides of the issue have been reflected in
the recent work of the Supreme Court. The number of cases presenting
search and seizure problems has increased sharply, culminating with the
now famous case of Mapp v. Ohio.'2 Given this development, this
article, which concentrates on the Mapp case, seeks to present an ap-
proach to the area. 3 No attempt is made to be either definitive or com-
7 "Courts can protect the innocent against such invasions only indirectly and through
the medium of excluding evidence obtained against those who frequently are guilty."
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 181 (1948) (dissenting opinion). But, this
pathway raises one of the most fundamental, and as yet unexplored, issues. A "rule
protective of law-abiding citizens is not apt to flourish where its advocates are usually
criminals." Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 314 (1959) (dissenting opinion).
8 The call here is for "precisely the qualities society has a right to expect from
those entrusted with ultimate judicial power." Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172
(1952).
0 See Coakley, Restrictions in the Law of Arrest, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 2 (1957) and
materials cited therein at note 2. There are many pressures toward earlier and easier
arrests. See Barrett, Personal Rights, Property Rights and the Fourth Amendinent,
SUPREME COURT REVIEW 65-70 (1960).
10 See, e.g., REPORT OF TIE PRESIDENT'S COMMtEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS 25-29 (1947);
Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 603 (1956)
Comment, Philadelphia Police Practice and the Law of Arrest, 100 U. PA. L. REv.
1182 (1952).
"1 Frankfurter, J., in Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 157 (1947).
12 367 U.S. 643 (1961). An extension of time was granted to allow Ohio to file a
motion for review. See Miller, Illegally Obtained Evidence, 10 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV.
477, 478 (1961) ; but petition for rehearing was denied on the opening of the 1961
October term. 30 U.S.L. WEEK 3115 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1961).
13 For additional remarks, see, Comment, The Washington Law of Arrest Without
W arrant-Incidental Search, infra at 501. See also, VARON, SEARCHES, SEIZURES AND
IMMUNITIES (1961) (2 vols.) ; MORELAND, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1959).
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prehensive, but rather illustrative and exploratory. The primary themes
developed are: (1) the constitutional foundation of the right to personal
privacy and security; (2) the constitutional status of the sanction which
makes that right effective, i.e., the exclusionary rule; and (3) concomit-
ant considerations of federalism.
A convenient starting point for analysis is 1886. Seventy-six years
ago the Court decided a climacteric case, Boyd v. United States,' hold-
ing that the fourth and fifth amendments, in relation to each other, dis-
allowed the compulsory production of private documents by a defend-
ant in proceedings which were criminal in nature. The case is highly
important for its approach to the term "unreasonable" found in the
fourth amendment and because it is one of the primary supports of
Mapp. Obvious too, is its import as a major step in reversing the
common-law rule that evidence, although illegally obtained, is admis-
sible in federal courts.
Congress had passed a statute, seeking to implement the revenue
laws. It authorized any attorney representing the government in any
suit arising under the revenue laws, other than in criminal proceedings,
to make a written motion describing the document and the allegation
which he expected it would prove, whenever, in his belief, any document
possessed by a defendant "will tend to prove any allegation made by
the United States."' 5 The statute then gave the trial court discretionary
power to issue a notice compelling a defendant to produce the document,
and "if the defendant or claimant shall fail or refuse, [then] the allega-
tions stated in said motion shall be taken as confessed .... I'l6 As
applied to him, Boyd objected to the constitutionality of both the trial
court's order and the statute, but he did produce the incriminating
evidence, an invoice, and was held to have forfeited certain cargo im-
ported into the United States without having first paid revenue duties
thereon. On review, the Supreme Court noted that the proceedings,
although "instituted for the purpose of declaring a forfeiture of a man's
property by reason of offenses committed by him, though they may be
civil in form, are in their nature criminal";"' and it did reach the con-
stitutional questions.
The Court construed the statutory provision, in substance, as author-
izing a search and seizure even though its literal wording only required
a defendant to produce the desired documents or suffer the conse-
14116 U.S. 616 (1886).
25 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 620 (1886).
1( Ibid.
17 Id. at 634.
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quences of non-production. In fact, there had been no search or seizure.
This characterization was deemed proper by the Court because the
supporting statutory section required that if the defendant did not
produce the desired documents, then the allegations which the prosecut-
ing attorney had affirmed that they would prove should be taken as
having been conclusively proved. To the Court's mind, this was "tanta-
mount to compelling their production"' 8 for, in any event, "the prose-
cuting attorney will always be sure to state the evidence expected to
be derived from them as strongly as the case will admit .... ." Since
it was a material ingredient effecting the very purpose of search and
seizure, the order requiring "a compulsory production of a man's private
papers to establish a criminal charge against him ... is within the scope
of the fourth amendment."" The only remaining question was whether
the search and seizure was unreasonable in the constitutional sense,"'
i.e., did it invade the right to privacy.
To answer this question, the Court drew on Lord Camden's opinion
in Entick v. Carrington2 and on the intimate relation which it saw be-
tween the fourth and fifth amendments. Entick v. Carrington was
viewed as having lain down principles affecting the very essence of con-
stitutional liberty and security-
It is not the breaking of his doors and the rummaging of his drawers,
that constitutes the essence of the offense; but [rather] it is the invasion
of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private
property, ... it is the invasion of this sacred right which underlies and
constitutes the essence of Lord Camden's judgment.2 3
Also, the case was seen as having provided the draftsmen of the fourth
amendment with the true standard, separating reasonable from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures. Simply put, the distinguishing criterion
was the notion of a man's personal right to privacy which would be
violated by any forcible and compulsory extortion by government of
a man's testimony or of his private papers to be used as evidence to
is Id. at 622.
1' Ibid.
20 Ibid.
2. Ibid. "Is a search and seizure, or, what is equivalent thereto, a compulsory pro-
duction of a man's private papers, to be used in evidence against him in a proceeding
to forfeit his property for alleged fraud against the revenue laws-is such a proceeding
for such a purpose an 'unreasonable search and seizure' within the meaning of the
fourth amendment of the Constitution ?"
22 19 HOWELL'S STATE TRIALS 1029 (1765). Entick must have been encouraged by
the earlier success of John Wilkes. See Wilkes v. Wood, Lofft 1, 98 Eng. Rep. 489
(1763).
23 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). This statement was also quoted
approvingly in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391 (1914).
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convict him of a crime-the breaking and entering of a house being
viewed as mere circumstance of aggravation. "In this regard the fourth
and fifth amendments run almost into each other."'2 !
Impressed by the "intimate relation between the two amendments,"2
the Court grounded its decision on the notion that they threw great
light on each other. In the Court's eye, the unreasonable searches and
seizures condemned by the fourth amendment are almost always made
for the purpose of compelling a man to give evidence against himself
which in criminal cases is barred by the fifth amendment. Conversely,
the constitutional right not to be a witness against oneself in a criminal
case "throws light on the question as to what is an 'unreasonable search
and seizure' within the meaning of the fourth amendment? '26
Unable to perceive a difference between a seizure of a man's private
papers to be used in evidence against him and compelling a man to be a
witness against himself, both being equally violative of a man's personal
right to privacy and security, the Court decided that the proceedings
and the congressional statute requiring compulsory production of the
document transgressed both amendments. "We think they are within
the spirit of both."2 It held that the order to produce the invoice and
its later admission into evidence "were erroneous and unconstitutional
proceedings." 8
One effect of Boyd is that the exclusionary rule is part and parcel of
the substantive constitutional right to privacy. Further, it implies that
24 Boyd v. United States, supra note 23, at 630. This does not mean that Boyd
interprets the Constitution to allow two classes of searches: warrantless but reasonable
and those on a warrant. On the contrary, the view is that general search warrant
searches are prohibited, and this means then that whenever the fourth amendment's
right to privacy is involved, there must be a warrant issued in" keeping with the second
clause. See, ANNALS OF- CONG. 783 (1789). But note, the interpretation in Frank v.
Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959). But this case rests on Wolf and has doubts cast
upon it by Mapp.
25 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886).
26 Ibid. Three recent cases can be interpreted a's refining this idea further so that
a search not made for evidence of a crime or which may not threaten a deprivation of
life, liberty or property will be viewed as involving solely the right to privacy. Without
additional civil liberties being threatened, this interest alone may not require the
customary restrictions on searches and allow a liberalization of law enforcement
methods. See Frank v. Maryland, 339 U.S. 360 (1959) ; Abel v. United States, 362
U.S. 217 (1960); Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960). These cases may separate
violations of the right to privacy of a home-owner by a simple search which is not
seeking evidence of a crime from those violations where the search is made as a short-
cut to usual police work, i.e., searches for evidence of crime. But conpare the view
advanced in District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13, aff'd on other grounds, 339
U.S. 1 (1950). Note also, Comment, Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court, 28
U. CHL L. REv. 664 (1961).
27 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886).28Id. at 638. For further discussion see, Reynard, Freedom From Unreasonable
Search and Seizure-A Second Class Constitutional Right?, 25 IND. L. J. 259 (1950).
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an indiscriminate subpoena or rambling "search for evidence" is unlaw-
ful. But, on the other hand, a subpoena issued or a search made on the
basis of probable cause seeking unlawful things or papers actually used
to commit a crime is permissible.29
The Boyd case is considered at length because it is illustrative of
several points. Firstly, in the Court's view, Boyd confronted it with an
invasion of a man's personal right to privacy and security in that the
invoice was characterized as a "private paper.""0 Secondly, the case
rests on the view that the fourth amendment and the fifth amendment's
self-incrimination clause, in conjunction, were designed primarily for
the purpose of protecting that common interest which each person has
against uncontrolled invasions of his privacy and security, whether the
threat of governmental force be aimed at unreasonably breaking and
entering his home, seizing his papers, or invading his person by way of
forcefully extorting self-incriminating statements."1 Lastly, there can
be no doubt that the reasons for excluding the evidence in Boyd were
thoroughly grounded on constitutional considerations and did not rest
on the Court's inherent, judicial power to shape rules of evidence which
Congress might later negate.2 Indeed, the majority opinion which
29 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1919) ; Gouled v. United
States, 225 U.S. 298 (1921). See MORELAND, MODERN CRIMINAL PRocEDuRE 103-07
(1959). Also compare to Boyd, Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906) ; Adams v. New
York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904).
80 The point was emphasized again notwithstanding the fact that the invoice in
Boyd was a record required by law and to that extent one in which the public had
some interest. See, Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in Shapiro v. United
States, 335 U.S. 67 (1948) ; Reynard, supra note 28, at 284-85.
31 This premise has been challenged by the argument that the principles embodied
in the two amendments came into the common law at different times and independent
of each other. However, this does not necessarily mean that they fail to express a
common concept. See, State v. Frye, 58 Ariz. 409, 120 P.2d 793 (1942) ; Note, Private
Documents and the Fifth Amendment, 44 Ky. L. J. 345 (1956). In this regard, the
Court has held that private documents located in execution of a valid search warrant
could be introduced into evidence over a fifth amendment objection, and that court
power to issue a subpeona duces tecum for certain purposes was not vitiated by the
fourth amendment. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906). See, MORELAND, MODERN
CRIMINAL PRocEDURE 100-37 (1959).
32 "It was in that [Boyd] case demonstrated that both of these amendments con-
templated perpetuating, in their full efficacy, by means of a constitutional provision,
principles of humanity and civil liberty, which had been secured in the mother country
only after years of struggle, so as to implant them in our institutions in the fullness of
their integrity, free from the possibilities of future legislative change." Bram v. United
States, 168 U.S. 532, 544 (1897). This point was made again in Adams v. New York,
192 U.S. 585, 590 (1904) where the Court viewed the constitutional bar as pertaining
not only to the processes of gathering of evidence which were unlawful, but also to
the use of such evidence. Note the full argument in the Brief for Plaintiff In Error
at 15-20. Also note the change in Mr. Justice Black's position from Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25, 39 (1948), to Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 661 (1961). See also, Grant,
Constitutional Basis of the Rule Forbidding the Use of Illegally Seized Evidence, 15
So. CAL. L. REV. 60 (1941).
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carried seven votes was emphatic on this point, resting fundamentally
on the fourth-fifth amendment relation, while the concurring opinion of
the remaining two justices would have grounded the Boyd result on
the fifth amendment alone. s
The Court continued to exclude illegally obtained evidence on consti-
tutional grounds, rationalizing its result on the interplay of the two
amendments." But no clear-cut decision appeared. Finally, in 1914,
Weeks v. United States35 put the matter at rest, at least insofar as the
federal courts were concerned, and also set forth proper court pro-
cedures for invoking the exclusionary rule."
The usual rule of procedure is that a court, at time of trial, is not
bound to try collateral issues;"7 hence, to be effective, a motion to sup-
press or return illegally obtained evidence should be made prior to the
trial.3 8 The reason for this rule is that it "works no injustice on the
person charged with the crime, but greatly facilitates the trial of
cases." ' The breach of this rule compounded confusion and led to
Weeks.
Two cases involving similar issues but reaching opposite conclusions
were decided two years apart by the Circuit Court for the Southern
District of New York. In one of them, it was held that a motion to
suppress and return illegally seized evidence could not be ruled upon
prior to trial." The effect of this position would be to allow the use of
illegally seized evidence for the purpose of obtaining a true bill or
indictment from a grand jury, or, if evidence supporting a charge other
than that relevant to the initial charge be found, then the additionally
found evidence could be used as a basis for drawing an indictment or
information and possibly obtaining a conviction. But in the second
case which also involved a motion, made prior to trial, for a return of
illegally seized evidence, the judge ruled that the "petition to direct the
33 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 638 (1886) Reynard supra note 28.
34 See, e.g., Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897); Adams v. New York, 192
U.S. 585 (1904).
35 232 U.S. 383 (1914).36 For discussion see 2 VARoN, SEARCHES, SEIzUREs AND IMMUNITIES 659-708
(1961).
37 State v. Dersiy, 121 Wash. 455, 209 Pac. 837 (1922).
3 See, State v. Miles, 29 Wn.2d 921, 190 P.2d 740 (1948); State v. Gunkel, 188
Wash. 528, 63 P.2d 376 (1936). Even though timely made, the court need not pass on
the motion immediately but can postpone decision until trial. This position is probably
vitiated by Mapp which relies on Weeks. See discussion infra. The usual procedural
rule does not apply where defendant had no opportunity to learn of the unconstitutional
search until trial. See, Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 305 (1921) ; Amos v.
United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921).
39 State v. Dersiy, 121 Wash. 455, 458, 209 Pac. 837, 838 (1922).
40 United States v. Wilson, 163 Fed. 338 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1908).
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district attorney to return the books is granted."'" The issue was pre-
sented to the Supreme Court in the Weeks case which follows.
Without authority, but thinking he might obtain additional evidence,
a United States marshal entered the room of Weeks after the marshal
had been handed-"on a silver platter"-lottery tickets which had
been found by state police when, earlier and without a warrant, they
had searched the premises. The marshal took certain letters and en-
velopes found in Weeks' room, and defendant, prior to trial, filed a
petition for return of all items. The trial court directed the return of
such property as was not pertinent to the charge against defendant,
but denied the petition as to pertinent matter, reserving the right to
pass on them at a later time. At trial, the lottery tickets and other
pertinent letters which had not been returned were admitted into evi-
dence over defendant's objection which was based on the fourth and
fifth amendments. Weeks was convicted. On review, the Court viewed
the issue in the case as requiring a "determination of the duty of the
court with reference to the motion made by defendant for the return
of certain letters, as well as other papers, taken from his room by the
United States marshal.) 4
Specifically not reaching the dual sovereignty problem,44 the Court
reversed, ruling that the items illegally seized by the marshal should
have been returned. It grounded the ruling squarely on the Constitu-
tion.
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in
evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th
Amendment, declaring his right to be secure against such searches and
seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned,
might as well be stricken from the Constitution.4
Hence, it can easily be seen that, to the Court's mind, the exclusionary
rule flowed out of the dictates of the Constitution itself.
The Court was deeply concerned that the fourth amendment and its
exclusionary rule not be circumvented by way of procedural niceties.
Referring to the procedural point, it made clear that the defendant
"having made a seasonable application for their return (the letters
taken by the marshal), which was heard and passed upon by the court,
41 United States v. Mills, 185 Fed. 318, 320 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911). True, the cases
can be distinguished but to do so would not reflect any difference between them.
42 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 388 (1914).
43 Id. at 389.
44 Id. at 398.
45 Id. at 393.
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there was involved in the order refusing the application a denial of the
constitutional rights of the accused, and that the court should have
restored these letters to the accused.""
In summary then, it is clear that the Court's fundamental approach
was identical to that taken in Boyd; indeed, it expressly relied on
much of the Boyd reasoning. In Weeks, the Court viewed the taking
of the letters as presenting an invasion of a man's personal right to
privacy. Secondly, it also relied, albeit flaccidly, on the "intimate
relation" between the fourth and fifth amendments. 1 And, lastly, it
viewed the exclusionary rule as a constitutional requirement, else the
fourth amendment "might as well be striken from the Constitution."'48
Evidence obtained through an unreasonable search and seizure by
federal agents was no longer admissible against the victim of such
search unless he knowingly waived his right to object to its introduc-
tion. In subsequent cases the Court has given additional meaning to
the exclusionary rule, and moreover, it has set out procedures relating
to it. 9 But, in Weeks, the Court set at rest its constitutional founda-
tions."0
THE FEDERALISm CONTEXT
None of the cases so far discussed directly concerned either the
possibility (1) whether the federal government in a prosecution in a
federal court might "avail itself of evidence improperly seized by state
48 Id. at 398.
4 Id. at 391-94.
48 Id. at 393. But cf. Justices Holmes' and Brandeis' view that the rule is a judge-made
one of evidence. Burdeau v. McIlowall, 256 U.S. 477 (1921) (dissenting opinion).
49 See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), and particularly, Silverthorne
Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) ; Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S.
298 (1921); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921). Professor Grant writes
that these decisions, plus a few others not cited in this article, mean "that the Court
had now completely rejected the common law rule... [that evidence is admissible even
though illegally obtained]. In its stead the Court had erected the rule that evidence
secured through an illegal search and seizure is inadmissible against the person whose
constitutional rights have been infringed. The new rule was qualified by a rule of
practice that one who has prior notice of the search waives his right to object to the
use of the evidence thereby secured unless he raises the question in such a way as to
give the Court an opportunity to pass upon it prior to trial, or unless the prosecution's
own evidence at the trial discloses its illegality." Grant, The Tarnished Silver Platter,
8 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1, 8 (1961).50 The subsequent pattern has caused some embarrassment to Boyd's . "intimate
relation" between the fourth and fifth amendments , and has resulted in speculation that
the exclusionary rule is based solely on the fourth amendment. In Silverthorne Lumber
Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920), the Court held that corporations, like
human beings, could, under the fourth amendment, invoke the exclusionary rule in the
event of an unreasonable search, but earlier it had held that corporation documents can
be obtained by subpeona because they do not come within fifth amendment protection
even though they could incriminate corporate officers or the corporation. For the
19611
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officers operating entirely upon their own account,"'" or (2) whether
there was a bar to the use of such evidence in state court proceedings.
Indeed, the issue in the Weeks case was narrowed to present only the
question of the fruit of the search conducted by the federal marshal,
thereby relieving the Court of the problems inherent in considerations
of dual sovereignty and federalism.52
These two issues squarely confronted the Court during the 1948
term,5" but it answered only one of them, which will be dealt with
secondly. When dealing with the question of admissibility of evidence
in federal court proceedings, when that evidence had been obtained by
state officers in violation of the fourth amendment, the Court did not
issue a square ruling, but, by dicta, it developed the "silver platter"
doctrine. 4 The crux of it is that:
A search, in the constitutional sense ... is a search by a federal official
if he had a hand in it; it is not a search by a federal official if evidence
secured by state authorities is turned over to the federal authorities on
a silver platter. The decisive factor.., is the actuality of a share by a
federal official in the total enterprise of securing and selecting evidence
by other than sanctioned means.... So long as he was in it before the
object of the search was completely accomplished, he must be deemed
to have participated in it.... Evidence secured through such federal
participation is inadmissible. 55
In Lustig the Court actually ruled only that since the federal agent
bad been called by state officials to the scene of the unlawful search,
and while there, he had selected the items he deemed important for use
in a federal prosecution, his role was not severable from the whole, and
corporate history of this point see, Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S.
186 (1946) ; Brown v. United States, 276 U.S. 134 (1928) ; FTC v. American Tobacco
Co., 264 U.S. 298 (1924) ; Essgee Co. v. United States, 262 U.S. 151 (1923) ; Dreier
v. United States, 221 U.S. 394 (1911) ; Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911);
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906). See Reynard, supra note 28, at 286.
51 In Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927), the Court intimated that the
answer was a guarded yes. See also Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944) ;
Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927), and Center v. United States, 267 U.S.
575 (1925).
52 "What remedies the defendant may have against [the state officials] we need not
inquire, as the 4th Amendment is not directed to individual misconduct of such officials.
Its limitations reach the Federal Government and its agencies." Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914).
53 In Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), and Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S.
74 (1949). Excellent analysis is found in Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig Ten Years Later,
43 MINN. L. REv. 1083 (1959); Allen, The Wolf Case, 45 ILL. L. REV. 1 (1945).
54 For a discussion of the rise, narrowing and final demise of the "silver platter"
doctrine, see Grant, The Tarnished Silver Platter, 8 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1 (1961) ; Com-
ment, 1960 U. ILL. L. F. 589.
55 Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 78-79 (1949).
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it "therefore was part of the search."5 Hence, error had been committed
when the evidence was admitted, and the case was reversed.T
The converse implication of the ruling deserves a word. It should
be noted that Lustig did not decide that evidence handed to federal
officials on a "silver platter" would be admissible.58 It hinted that it
might be, but such a result would have required the Court to have
reached and discussed the questions inherent in considerations of
federalism. However, it did not analyze the very important issue of
dual sovereignty, and the case does not speak to that problem. The
Court was evenly split on the issue. Four justices believed the unlawful
search was made solely by state officials and that the evidence had
been received on a "silver platter" by federal officials; hence, they
voted to admit the evidence; 9 but four other justices were equally
convinced that the important fact was the unlawful search, and
"whether state or federal officials did the searching is of no conse-
quence."" ° Mr. Justice Frankfurter's vote disposed of the case, but he
took no stand on the issue of federalism. 1 Hence, the final vote on
the "silver platter" doctrine was 4 to 4, and this split accounts for
Chief Justice Warren's 1957 footnote to the Benanti case where, citing
Lustig, he said: "It has remained an open question.., whether evi-
dence obtained solely by state agents in an illegal search may be
admissible in federal court despite the fourth amendment." 62
Furthermore, the fourth amendment limitations apply to the federal
government whereas the fourteenth amendment applies to the states.
By Court adjudication the first clause of the fourth amendment now
applies to the states "through the fourteenth."" But at the time Lustig
was argued, the Court had not yet decided that any part of the fourth
amendment was incorporated into the fourteenth. Hence, the un-
reasonable search and seizure made by the state officials in Lustig in
no way flouted any part of the Constitution. The premise of constitu-
tionality is basic to the silver platter doctrine. It is ironic that this
18Id. at 78.5 7 Id. at 81.58 Id. at 79. '"Where there is participation on the part of federal officers it is not
necessary to consider what would be the result if the search had been conducted en-
tirely by state officers."519 Id. at 80.60 Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 80 (1949). But the reasons differed. Mr.
Justice Black rejected federalism as a bar to the guarantee against self-incrimination.
Justices Murphy, Douglas and Rutledge rejected dual sovereignty as a bar to the
fourth amendment guarantee against unconstitutional searches and seizures.61 For further discussion see, Grant, supra note 54, at 12-13.
62 Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96, 102 (1957), n.10.
03 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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fundamental point, supporting the "silver platter" doctrine, was under-
mined on the very day that doctrine was born. For accompanying
Lustig was Wolf v. Colorado64 in which it was unequivocably deter-
mined by a unanimous Court that the federal constitution, by virtue
of the fourteenth amendment, prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures by state officers. If Lustig were decided after Wolf, the actions
by the state officials in Lustig would have flouted the Constitution!
The "silver platter" doctrine soon became the subject of much dis-
cussion,"5 and eleven years later, in 1960, the Supreme Court set
matters at rest in two celebrated cases,6 ruling that evidence seized
in an unreasonable search by state officers must be excluded from a
federal criminal trial upon the timely objection of a defendant who
has standing to complain." In the Elkins opinion, Mr. Justice Potter
Stewart, writing for the majority, noted the ironic anomaly that the
Wolf case had removed "the foundation upon which the admissibility
of state-seized evidence in a federal trial originally rested."" "For
surely no distinction can logically be drawn between evidence obtained
in violation of the Fourth Amendment and that obtained in violation
of the Fourteenth. The Constitution is flouted equally in either case." 9
Curiously, however, Mr. Justice Stewart did not rest the Elkins
decision on the view that the Constitution itself required the exclusion,
from federal courts, of evidence seized during an unreasonable search
by state officers. He stated that "any apparent limitation upon the
64 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
65 Allen, supra note 53, at 14-25; Galler, The Exclusion of Illegal State Evidence
in Federal Courts, 49 J. CRim. L., C.&P.S. 455 (1958) ; Kohn, Admissibility in Federal
Court of Evidence Illegally Seized by State Officers, 1959 WASH. U.L.Q. 229; Kamisar,
supra note 53; Parsons, State-Federal Crossfire in Search and Seizure and Self-
Incrimination, 42 CORNELL L. Q. 346, 347-68 (1957); Comment, Judcial Control of
Illegal Search and Seizure, 58 YAE L. J. 144 (1948).
6 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960) ; Rios v. United States, 364 U.S.
253 (1960).
67 In Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), the Court recently passed on stand-
ing. The case involved a defendant who was tried for illicit possession of narcotics
and had denied his possessory interest. He was disallowed, by the lower courts,
standing to object to an unconstitutional search because he was a guest in an apartment
and had denied property interest in the narcotics. On review, the Court said: "Dis-
tinctions such as those between 'lessee,' 'licensee,' 'invitee,' and 'guest,' often only of
gossamer strength, ought not to be determinative in fashioning procedures ultimately
referable to constitutional safeguards." 262 U.S. at 705. Petitioner's own testimony
had established that he was present in the apartment by consent: "Even were this not
a prosecution turning on illicit possession, the legally requisite interest in the premises
was here satisfied, for it need not be as extensive a property interest as was required
below." 262 U.S. at 703. The Court was also persuaded by defendant's dilemma that
possession would have conferred standing but would also have convicted him. See,
Comment, Standing to Object to an Unlawful Search and Seizure, 15 Wyo. L. J. 218
(1961).
68 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 213 (1960).
69 Id. at 215.
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process of discovering truth in a federal trial ought to be imposed only
upon the basis of considerations which outweigh the general need for
untrammeled disclosure of competent and relevant evidence in a court
of justice."7 0 Hence, the basis of the opinion appears to be:
What is here invoked is the Court's supervisory power over the
administration of criminal justice in the federal courts, under which
the Court has "from the very beginning of its history, formulated rules
of evidence to be applied in federal criminal prosecutions."... In de-
vising such evidentiary rules we are governed by "principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted... in the light of reason and
experience." 7'
This ruling marks the first time an unqualified majority opinion has
stated that the basis of the exclusionary rule in an unreasonable search
and seizure case flows from the Court's supervisory power over the
federal courts. It would appear, therefore, that in the federal courts
there are currently two exclusionary rules in this area. One of them has
a fourth amendment underpinning and excludes from federal courts
all evidence seized during an unreasonable search conducted by federal
officials . 7  The other exclusionary rule, announced in Elkins, has the
Court's supervisory power as its basis and operates when the constitu-
tionally unreasonable search has been made by state officials who turn
over their findings to federal officials on a "silver platter." In both
instances the result is the same-the evidence is excluded.
The reasons for not putting Elkins on a constitutional footing are
readily apparent. To have done so would, in effect, have expressed
concern about Wolf v. Colorado which had ruled that the Constitution
did not require that the exclusionary rule be applied to unlawfully
seized evidence introduced into state court trials.' The Court was not
yet ready to take this step. Secondly, the Elkins majority of five in-
cluded Mr. Justice Black who was unequivocal eleven years earlier
70 Id. at 216.
7Ibid.
72 This exclusionary rule applied to the fourth amendment area is similar to another
applied to coerced confessions, unreasonable detention, etc., and having the Court's
supervisory power as its base. See, McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943),
and discussion in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 649-50 (1961). See also, Allen, Due
Process and State Criminal Procedures, 48 Nw. U. L. REv. 16 (1953); Kamisar,
Illegal Searches and Seizures and Contemporaneous Incriminating Statements, 1961
U. Iii. L. F. 78; Hogan and Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule, 47 GEO. L. J. 1 (1958).
Actually, Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), could be argued as having estab-
lished yet another exclusionary rule which had the "due process clause" of the four-
teenth amendment as its base, thereby distinguishing it from the exclusionary rule
bound up in the first clause of the fourth amendment. See, Mapp v. Ohio, supra. at 657.
7s Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
74 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
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when, in a separate concurrence, he said "I agree... that the federal
exclusionary rule is not a command of the Fourth Amendment but is
a judicially created rule of evidence which Congress might negate."75
Apparently, Mr. Justice Black thought there was but one exclusionary
rule and had not yet concluded that it might properly have a constitu-
tional basis. Given these considerations, the Elkins opinion could not
command enough votes to give it a constitutional underpinning with
its broader and more absolute implications; nor would that course
necessarily have been a wise one. Perhaps these ideas explain Mr.
Justice Stewart's remarks in Elkins that "a rule which would exclude
evidence if, and only if, government officials in a particular case had
chosen to engage in unlawful conduct is of a different order.17
6
A third reason which perhaps will throw additional light on the
above statement, lies in the distinction between the two rules which can
give rise to very different applications. All evidence obtained in viola-
tion of the constitutional guarantee of the first clause of the fourth
amendment, prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, is both
unconstitutionally obtained and illegally obtained evidence, but the
contrary is not true. All evidence illegally seized is not therefore un-
constitutionally obtained. In addition, the second clause of the fourth
amendment regulating search warrants has not been explicitly applied
to the states. Consequently, the exclusionary rule voiced in Elkins can
be used to exclude evidence from federal courts which has been illegally
obtained by lawless law enforcement methods of state officials, yet their
activities may not come within the ban of the second clause of the
fourth amendment. If there were only one exclusionary rule and
Elkins had restricted it to a fourth amendment basis, this result would
not follow.
In summary then, it can be seen that the Court currently has two
exclusionary rules. Under them it can, as an exercise of its advisory
powers, require the exclusion from federal courts of all unconstitu-
tionally seized evidence gathered by state officials in violation of any
part of the fourth amendment, even though the second clause of that
amendment may not apply to the states. Further, it must exclude from
the federal courts all unconstitutionally seized evidence gathered by
federal agents contrary to the bar of the entire fourth amendment.
Dark indeed is the funereal glow of the now tarnished silver platter."
75 Id. at 39-40.
76 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 216 (1960).
77 For further discussion see, Grant, supra note 54.
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The remaining question of federalism involves the states more di-
rectly and pertains to whether state courts can allow into evidence in
state criminal trials materials seized during an unreasonable search.
A preliminary answer came in 1949 in Wolf v. Colorado."8 This once
leading case must be considered, even though now partially overruled
by Mapp v. Ohio. 9 It is factually simple." Wolf, a licensed physician,
was convicted of conspiracy to commit abortion. At his trial, two day-
books containing records of people who consulted him professionally
were introduced into evidence over his objections. The day-books had
been obtained by staff officials of the local prosecutor through an un-
reasonable search and seizure. In the Court's view, Wolf squarely
presented it with the question:
Does a conviction by a State court for a State offense deny the "due
process of law" required by the Fourteenth Amendment, solely because
evidence that was admitted at the trial was obtained under circum-
stances which would have rendered it inadmissible in a prosecution
for violation of a federal law in a court of the United States because
there deemed to be an infraction of the Fourth Amendment as applied
in Weeks v. United States?"'- [Citations omitted.]
The Court sustained Wolf's conviction, and its reasoning follows:
first, the Court unanimously decided that:
The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police
-which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment- is basic to a free
society. It is therefore implicit in "the concept of ordered liberty" and
as such enforceable against the States through the Due Process
Clause ....
... [W] ere a state affirmatively to sanction such police incursion into
privacy it would run counter to the guarantee of the Fourteenth
Amendment.82
Having decided that there is a constitutional ban on state officials not
to commit unreasonable searches and seizures, the Court split on the
second major point in Wolf. By vote of 6 to 3, it decided that the
constitutionally dictated exclusionary rule of Boyd and Weeks did not
apply to the states. The Court did not discuss or consider the second
clause of the fourth amendment. Only the core of the fourth amend-
78338 U.S. 25 (1949). The Court refused to rule on the issue in an earlier case:
Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 594 (1904).79367 U.S. 643 (1961).
8o See, Wolf v. Colorado, 117 Colo. 279, 187 P.2d 926 (1947).81 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25. 26 (1949).82 Id. at 27-28.
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ment-that is, the first clause but without its inherent exclusionary
rule-was to be enforced by the Court against the states. In fact, the
majority opinion declared that the exclusionary rule of Weeks "was not
derived from the explicit requirements of the Fourth Amendment; it
was not based on legislation expressing Congressional policy in the
enforcement of the Constitution."8 But rather, the Weeks decision was
a matter of "judicial implication."'84 One might ask: implied from
what? But the opinion did not answer that question; instead, after
acknowledging the constitutional foundation for the basic right to
privacy, it continued:
[T] he ways of enforcing such a basic right raise questions of a different
order. How such arbitrary conduct should be checked, what remedies
against it should be afforded, the means by which the right should be
made effective, are all questions that are not to be so dogmatically
answered as to preclude the varying solutions which spring from an
allowable range of judgment on issues not susceptible of quantitative
solution.85
The final upshot of the Wolf case then, was for the Court to allow
the states to fashion remedies for violations of the constitutional right
to privacy when invaded by state officials. Yet, nowhere in the opinion
is there an explicit command that the states must fashion remedies.8"
This was assumed, and the assumption has given rise to at least one
anomaly. Indiana followed the exclusionary rule, and a trial court had
admitted into evidence materials allegedly unreasonably seized. A
conviction resulting thereon was affirmed on appeal." The Indiana
court held that the search was reasonable under its state law. Defend-
ant filed for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court; that court
held that the fourteenth amendment did not preclude illegally seized
evidence from state court proceedings even though the state had
adopted the exclusionary rule, and perhaps had misapplied it!88 Con-
sequently, if they should choose to do so by subtle manipulation, the
states could flout the constitutional right to privacy, and, consistent
with Wolf, they might fail to develop any sanction at all. One com-
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.85 Ibid.
86 However, the Court did say: "[W]e have no hesitation in saying that were a
State affirmatively to sanction such police incursion into privacy it would run counter
to the guaranty of the Fourteenth Amendment." 338 U.S. at 28.
87 Sisk v. State, 232 Ind. 214, 110 N.E.2d 627; cert. denied, 346 U.S. 838 (1953).
88 Sisk v. Overlade, 220 F.2d 68 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 876 (1955).
Noted in 69 HARV. L. REv. 758 (1956).
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mentator aptly summarized the mischief of the Wolf opinion when he
characterized it as performing, "the unusual, if not unprecedented, feat
of simultaneously creating a constitutional right and denying the most
effective remedy for violation of that right." 9
Only a few examples need be presented to demonstrate that the
Court itself was none too pleased with Wolf. The first9" is illustrated by
a case arising three years after Wolf, presenting a flagrant violation of
a person's right to privacy by state officials. They broke into a man's
bedroom; ejected him from his bed and forced an emetic down his
throat, making him vomit, and thereby obtained two capsules of mor-
phine which were used to convict him at a subsequent trial. On review,
the Supreme Court reversed the conviction but did not discuss whether
Wolf properly allowed the morphine into evidence during a state court
trial. Instead, it made an exception. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who
authored Wolf and also wrote the Court's opinion in Rockin, said that
"this is conduct that shocks the conscience,"" and that "the conviction
of the petitioner has been obtained by methods that offend the Due
Process Clause."92 In other words, some unreasonable searches are so
unreasonable that Wolf did not apply because law enforcement activity
was so brutal and heinous in its invasion of a man's privacy. This
rationale posed impossible problems for the Court.
Two years later another note of discontent with Wolf was sounded
in Irvine v. California" where the Court reviewed a conviction based on
conversations which had been heard by state police who had illegally
concealed a microphone in the bedroom where the suspect and his wife
slept. On review, the Court severely castigated the police miscon-
duct,9" but it affirmed the conviction on the basis of precedent. Mr.
Justice Clark was especially dissatisfied, and although voting to affirm,
he concurred separately saying:
Had I been here in 1949 when Wolf was decided, I would have ap-
plied the doctrine of Weeks... to the states. But the Court refused to
do so then, and it still refuses today. Thus Wolf remains the law and,
as such, is entitled to the respect of this Court's membership .... In
89 Perlman, Due Process and the Admissibility of Evidence, 64 HAmv. L. Rxv. 1304
(1951). See also materials cited in note 65 supra.9oRochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). But compare, Breithaupt v. Abram,
352 U.S. 432 (1957). See Allen, Due Process and State Criminal Procedures, 48
Nw. U. L. Ray. 1, 22-28 (1953), for analysis of the impact of the Rochin case.91 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).921d. at 174.
93347 U.S. 128 (1954).94 Later, it was moved to the bedroom closet.95 Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 132 (1954).
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light of the "incredible" activity of the police here, it is with great
reluctance that I follow Wolf. 96
Given the Court's discontent with the unworkability of Wolf, it
should come as no surprise when, last term, the case was overruled by
Mapp v. Ohio97 in an opinion written for the Court by Mr. Justice
Clark." Factually, what occurred was that police officers broke and
entered Miss Mapp's home, most probably without a warrant,9 9 and
searched the bedroom, livingroom, kitchen and dinette, basement, and
a child's room after having handcuffed and run "roughshod over appel-
lent. 19 ° The state officials located, and later introduced in evidence,
under the Wolf rule, certain materials for the possession of which she
was ultimately convicted. On review, the Supreme Court reversed,
holding "that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in viola-
tion of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a
state court."..0 ' "To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality
to withhold its privilege and enjoyment."'0 2
To reach its conclusion, the Court cited and quoted Entick v. Car-
rington,"°3 but particularly it noted the Boyd case, and its intimate
relation between the fourth and fifth amendments protecting a man's
"indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private
property."'0 4 Secondly, the Weeks case was analyzed to see whether its
9 6 1d. at 138-39.
97367 U.S. 643 (1961). Another case forecasting the demise of Wolf was Rea v.
United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956) ; which allowed an injunction against federal offi-
cials from testifying in state trials concerning unconstitutionally seized evidence. See,
Eichner, Impact of the Rea Case on the Law of Illegal Search and Seizure, 9 U. FLA.
L. REv. 178 (1956) ; Parsons, State-Federal Crossfire in Search and Seizure and Self-
Incrimination, 42 CORNELL L. Q. 346, 349-63 (1957) ; Handler, The Fourth Amend-
,nent, Federalism, and Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 8 SYRACUSE L. REv. 166, 185-90 (1957).
98 Mr. Justice Clark's position is not startling in light of Irvine, but it is somewhat
surprising since he did join in a strong dissent in Elkins and Rios which argued from
the basic premise of Wolf.
09 This point is only slightly in doubt for when the police entered Miss Mapp's
home: "She demanded to see the search warrant. A paper, claimed to be a warrant,
was held up by one of the officers. She grabbed the 'warrant' and placed it in her
bosom. A struggle ensued in which the officers recovered the piece of paper and as
a result of which they handcuffed appellant because she had been 'belligerent' in re-
sisting their official rescue of the 'warrant' from her person." Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 644-45 (1961). At trial no search warrant was introduced into evidence, nor was
the failure to produce one explained, thus leading the Ohio Supreme Court to conclude,
"There is, in the record, considerable doubt as to whether there ever was any warrant
for the search of defendant's home." 170 Ohio St. 427, 430, 166 N.E.2d 387, 389 (1960).
100 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 645 (1961).
101 Id. at 655.
102 Id. at 656.
103 19 HOwELL'S STATE TRIALS 1029 (1765).
104 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 647 (1961). When viewing the fourth amendment
right along the Boyd-Weeks line of right to privacy, the Court fully indicated that it
was protecting liberty and thereby removed whatever previously existing objections
to the exclusionary rule as having "shifted the balance of judicial protection even
[VOL. 36
THE END OF AN EXPERIMENT
exclusionary rule was one of evidence or was constitutionally re-
quired,' ° and the Court concluded that "the plain and unequivocal
language of Weeks- and its later paraphrase in Wolf-to the effect
that the Weeks rule is of constitutional origin, remains entirely undis-
turbed."" 6 Thirdly, the constitutionally required exclusionary rule as
an inherent and necessary part of the fourth amendment's right to
privacy'07 was carefully distinguished from the other exclusionary rule
based on the Court's advisory power over the federal courts. The latter
is based on "principles governing the admissibility of evidence in federal
criminal trials ... [and has] not been restricted to those derived solely
from the Constitution."'0 8 Therefore, since "the Fourth Amendment's
right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the States
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable
against them by the same sanction of exclusion as is used against the
Federal Government."'09
It should be noted that Mr. Justice Clark's opinion for the Court
did not fully accept Boyd's "intimate fourth-fifth relationship" as the
constitutional basis for the exclusionary rule. Although somewhat am-
biguously, it does accept the Boyd relationship as the basis for the right
to privacy which now appears to have become the accepted interpreta-
tion of the fourth amendment."0 Instead, it put the constitutionally
required exclusionary rule on the "fourth amendment's right of pri-
vacy." To have done otherwise and to have rested Mapp squarely on
Boyd reasoning would have meant to have applied at least part of the
fifth amendment to the states through the fourteenth. The Court has
not taken this step yet, and obviously, it was reluctant to do so in
Mapp."' Indeed, this thought is reflected by the separate concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice Black, where he maintained that he was
still not persuaded that the Fourth Amendment, standing alone, would
further toward the protection of property as opposed to liberty." See BARRETT, PER-
SONAL RIGHTS, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, SUPREME COURT
REvmw 54 (1960).
105 "There are in the cases of this Court some passing references to the Weeks rule
as being one of evidence." Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 649 (1961).
106 Ibid. But compare Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28, where Mr. Justice Frank-
furter wrote: "It was not derived from the explicit requirement of the Fourth Amend-
ment.... The decision was a matter of judicial implication."
107 Miiapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651 (1961). "...the exclusionary rule is an essen-
tial ingredient of the Fourth Amendment... "'
108 Id. at 650, distinguishing McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
109 iMfapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). See, Symposium on the Exclusionary
Rule, 52 J. CirM. LAw 246 (1961).010 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 647-48 (1961). The transition case appears to be
Weeks as it interprets Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
" 'This issue has a long history which has been ably told. See, Cohen v. Hurley,
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be enough of a bar to the introduction into evidence against an accused
of papers and effects seized from him in violation of its commands.
... Reflection on the problem ... has led me to conclude that when the
Fourth Amendment's ban against unreasonable searches and seizures
is considered together with the Fifth Amendment's against compelled
self-incrimination, a constitutional basis emerges which not only justi-
fies but actually requires the exclusionary rule.112
The final upshot of the Court's opinion concerning the exclusionary
rule reveals several clear elements. First, there is the initial holding of
Wolf that the first clause of the fourth amendment through the four-
teenth grants a personal right to privacy and security and also prohibits
its violation through unreasonable searches and seizures by state offi-
cers; it still stands. But the next step-that the exclusionary rule is
not an essential ingredient of that right-is overruled. Instead, the
exclusionary rule now applies to the states as part of the fourteenth
amendment. Secondly, the exclusionary rule being "an essential in-
gredient of the right" to personal privacy and security, unquestionably
has a constitutional foundation. Thirdly, that exclusionary rule which
has a constitutional base must be distinguished from that other exclu-
sionary rule which rests on the Court's inherent advisory power over
the federal judiciary. But the split of opinion comes in assigning the
rule's exact constitutional underpinning. Four justices"' placed the
matter solely on the fourth amendment, but Mr. Justice Black rested
it on both the fourth and fifth amendments in relation to each other."
The Court's holding "that the exclusionary rule is an essential part of
both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments is not only the logical
dictate of prior cases, but it also makes very good sense." 1 ' There are
366 U.S. 117 (1961); GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY (1954); Kamisar,
supra note 72; Grant, Federalism and Self -Incrimination, 4 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 549
(1957); Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimnination, 34 MINN. L. REV. 1
(1949).
112 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 662 (1961) (concurring opinion). However, he
would not narrow either of the amendments in areas where they apply independently.
Id. at 662, n.4.
113 Justices Clark, Brennan, Douglas and Chief Justice Warren. Mr. Justice Potter
Stewart voted to reverse, making the vote on that part of the case 6 to 3, but he did
not reach the constitutional questions discussed here. Justices Harlan, Frankfurter
and Whittaker dissented. The dissenting opinion is discussed infra.
114 "1 am persuaded ... to accept to the Boyd doctrine as controlling in this state
case ..." Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 666 (1961). His opinion is a most interesting tribute
to honesty, for he confesses error for having concurred in Wolf where he indicated that
there was but one exclusionary rule, and it "is a judicially created rule of evidence
which Congress might negate." Instead, he should have joined Mr. Justice Rutledge's
dissent in that case for its position amounts to the view that illegally obtained evidence
in cases like Wolf, Rochin, Irvine or Boyd really amounts to compelling a man to be a
witness against himself contrary to the fifth amendment.
115 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961). Indeed, this was implicit in much of
the evidence relied on in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 218 (1960).
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two major reasons, one of which was recognized by the Court. Without
the Mapp holding, a double standard of law enforcement develops
which does not promote the fundamental aims of our federal system:
In non-exclusionary States, federal officers, being human, were by it
invited to, and did, as our cases indicate, step across the street to the
State's attorney with their unconstitutionally seized evidence. Prosecu-
tion on the basis of that evidence was then had in a state court in utter
disregard of the enforceable Fourth Amendment.11 6
The Court well understood that little can undermine a government more
quickly than a disregard of its own laws, or worse, its organic charter.
Unquestionably, law is one of the primary mirrors of a civilization,
reflecting the fundamental values on which it rests. The history of the
criminal law shows "that tolerance of shortcut methods in law enforce-
ment impairs its enduring effectiveness." 1 7 The Court was also well
aware that law-in-the-books did not necessarily describe actual police
practices. Consequently, judicial integrity could no longer permit the
right to privacy "to remain an empty promise," ' and in reality,
"federal-state cooperation in the solution of crime under constitutional
standards will be promoted, only,by recognition of their now mutual
obligation to respect the same fundamental criteria in their ap-
proaches." ''
The second reason supporting the exclusionary rule is simple: There
are no other remedies available which have made the right to privacy
effective when it is invaded by the police. 2 For example, in 1955,
California formally adopted the exclusionary rule "because other
remedies have completely failed to secure compliance with the consti-
tutional provisions on the part of police officers with the result that
the courts under the old rule have been constantly required to partici-
116 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 658 (1961).
117 Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313 (1958). For example consider the
implications of the following remarks: "The great majority of law enforcement
officers are presently so efficiently equipped and operated that any officer can get im-
mediate assistance merely by turning to his.., telephone or radio transmitter. These
same methods can just as easily be applied to the exchange of necessary informa-
tion... 2' J. Edgar Hoover, The Basis of Sound Law Enforcement, 291 ANNALS 39,
42 (1954), and again at p. 44, he writes that when dealing with the states, the FBI
"strives to cooperate in return through its central services."
11s Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961).
119 Id. at 658. The requirement that both state and federal officials "respect the
same fundamental criteria" clearly indicates the end of the notion that only the "core"
of the fourth amendment applies to the states; instead it is the entire first clause.120 See, Mr. Justice Murphy's dissent in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 41 (1949).
In fact the Court can choose only one remedy from three possible devices: ". . judicial
exclusion of the illegally obtained evidence; criminal prosecution of violators; and
civil action against violators in the action of trespass."
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pate in, and in effect condone, the lawless activities of law enforcement
officers.' 21 One elementary reason, transcending California state lines
and accounting for this sad state of affairs, which also eliminates the
effectiveness of almost all the alternative and potentially available
criminal sanctions, is that policemen and prosecutors alike simply do
not punish themselves. "It is absurd to suggest that any district attor-
ney, or superior officer, is going to take criminal action against one of
his subordinates. . .". " To accomplish his tasks, the prosecutor must
maintain a smoothly functioning internal staff, and he must have effi-
cient working relationships with the police. To threaten either of these
two mainstreams of effort with a widespread and continuous fear of
criminal punishment would reduce his "team" to puny ineffectiveness.
When this consideration is coupled with another, i.e., the prosecutor's
attitude of winning at any cost, which is too frequently found, one
discerning researcher "can see no hope for a change in attitude of our
police except through the basic examination of our attitudes toward
prosecutions."' 23 To rely on the use of criminal sanctions to make effec-
tive, on a broad scale, a person's right to privacy from law-enforcement
invasions is usually impracticable if not impossible." 4
The remaining set of remedies which could possibly protect a person's
constitutional right to privacy is found in the tort area, particularly
false imprisonment and trespass."25 Tort remedies too have proved
inadequate." 6 In Washington they are even less effective than in other
121 People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905, 911-12 (1955). The early impacts
of this case appear salutary, but in the long-run a community gets the type of police
force it wants. See, Barrett, Exclusion of Evidence Obtained by Illegal Searches-
A Comment on. People v. Cahan, 43 CAL. L. REV. 565, 584-86 (1955).
22 White v. Towers, 37 Cal. 2d 727, 737, 235 P.2d 209, 215-216 (1951) (dissenting
opinion).
12 Ernst, The Policeman and Due Process, 2 J. PUB. L. 250, 251 (1953). See also,
Edwards, Criminal Liability for Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 41 VA. L. REV.
621 (1955).
124 See also, DEUTSCH, THE TROUBLE WITH COPS (1955) ; Paulsen, The Fourteenth
Anendnent and The Third Degree, 6 STAN. L. REV. 411 (1954); Comment, 47 Nw.
U. L. REV. 493, 497-98 (1952) ; Dash, Cracks in the Foundation of Criminil Justice,
46 ILL. L. REV. 385 (1951); PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS, To SECURE
THESE RIGHTS (1947); HOPKINS, OUR LAWLESS POLICE (1931).
125 For a careful analysis of this area, and on which I draw, see, Foote, Tort
Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. REv. 493 (1955) ;
and Comment, Philadelphia Police Practice and the Law of Arrest, 100 U. PA. L. REV.
1182 (1952).
126 BEISEL, CONTROL OVER ILLEGAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 10-13(1955) ; CORNELIUS, THE LAW OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE 42-46 (2d ed. 1930) ; Hop-
KINS, OUR LAWLESS POLICE 28-30, 61-75, 89-92 (1931); MACHEN, THE LAW OF
SEARCH AND SEIZURE 138-42 (1950) ; Hall, Police and Law in a Democratic Society,
28 IND. L. J. 133, 152-57, 173 (1953) ; Way, Exclusion of Evidence Illegally Obtained,
26 TENN. L. REV. 332, 346-51 (1959).
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jurisdictions, due to a recent case, Plancich v. Williamson.2" This case
portends a long, rocky road for a Washington plaintiff, even though he
may have been arrested without a warrant after police had broken and
entered his home. His arduous journey might be relieved somewhat if
he were to sue in federal courts. The reason is that the United States
Supreme Court has held that the civil rights statute 128 is applicable in
a situation similar to the Plancick case. 29
The reasons why tort remedies have been ineffective are many. First,
the difficulties in collecting a judgment from a police officer are stagger-
ing,"8 ' and government liability for false imprisonment by government
agents has not developed.1"' A second, and more important, reason is
that the Court has indicated that the sum recovered in a false imprison-
ment case might not justify bringing the action because the amount of
recoverable damages "would probably depend upon the moral aspects
of the case."'32 Although police officers probably think twice before
searching or arbitrarily invading the privacy of a respectable citizen,
so that these citizens are not often bothered; even less frequently are
false imprisonment suits brought by them. To make the "moral aspects
of the case" a legitimate issue obviously deters many respectable per-
sons from bringing suits because they wish to forget the unpleasantries,
and few people of social status care to go to trial when their social or
financial reputations can be put in issue. For those who are respectable
but poor, the risk of financial loss is frequently too great, and an action
would be a pretension without possibility of recovery for those who are
not respectable, i.e., they have not acquired either the social or financial
status which can be damaged by illegal police activity.3
A third factor operating to deter tort suits is the fear of citizens of
127 157 Wash. Dec. 265, 357 P.2d 693 (1960). Noted in 36 WAsH. L. REv. 170
(1961). See also, White v. Towers, 37 Cal. 2d 727, 235 P.2d 209 (1951).
128 Rev. Stat. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1958) : "Every person who, under
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or im-
munities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."
129 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
330 See, Hall, The Law of Arrest in Relation to Contemporary Social Problems,
3 U. Car. L. REV. 345 (1936).
121 Anderson, Claims Against States, 7 VAND. L. Rxv. 234 (1954). "Indeed if there
is any trend at all it is in the opposite direction, as witness the exclusion of actions for
false arrest, false imprisonment and assault and battery from the Federal Torts Claims
Act." Foote, supra note 125, at 499.
.2 Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886).
122 See Butcher v. Adams, 310 Ky. 205, 220 S.W.2d 398 (1949).
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subsequent harassment and retribution by the police.114 In addition,
proof in these cases frequently relies heavily on testimony from one
police officer against another. This route has complications so well
known that they need not be detailed here. Hence, it easily can be seen
why tort actions simply have not proved themselves effective. 5 "The
measure of damages, defense and evidentiary rules which have grown
up with them have had the practical effect of importing a clean hands
doctrine into the remedies... 6 In short, without the exclusionary rule
and in accordance with the Wolf case, the fourth amendment's right to
privacy incorporated into the fourteenth would have been reduced to
"a form of words . '11 s
Perhaps the exclusionary rule is the only answer. It does not make
restitution to the invaded citizen, nor does it punish the officer who is
the actual wrongdoer. Instead, it operates to sensitize the police admin-
istration that it must bring its evidence-gathering methods into con-
formity with constitutional propriety.' "The purpose of the exclusion-
ary rule 'is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty
in the only effective available way-by removing the incentive to dis-
regard it.' ""', The Court has recognized the "obvious futility of rele-
gating the Fourth Amendment to the protection of other remedies."'"'
134 Comment, Philadelphia Police Practice and the Law of Arrest, 100 U. PA. L. REy.
1182 (1952). If vague suspicion aroused by prior criminal activity or bad reputation is
admissible, it will surely cripple the effectiveness of the sanction against harassment and
dragnet mass arrests: "Three-quarters of the arrests for disorderly conduct appear to
be illegal, in that that charge is used to cover lawful conduct of which the police dis-
approve.... Instances have been reported where mixed groups of whites and Negroes
have been arrested simply because of their fraternization. The charge has been used
against members of the Progressive Party allegedly for no other reason than party
affiliation, or that they meet in mixed groups.
Negroes who assert their rights against the police apparently do so in some cases at
the risk of arrest." Id. at 1201-02. See Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administra-
tion, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 603 (1956).
135 Consider the following data: "Over the past twelve years in the City of Los
Angeles, new claims for damages alleged to have resulted from alleged police miscon-
duct have averaged $1,000,000 per year.... The city wins 91 per cent of the cases and
... recoveries have averaged only 1/20 of I per cent of the total amount claimed...
Coakley, Restrictions in the Law of Arrest, 52 Nw. U. L. REv. 2, 5 (1957).
136 Foote, supra note 125, at 504.
137 Per Holmes, J., Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392
(1920).
138 We really know very little about the actual deterring effect of the rule. See, Ernst,
The Policeman and Due Process, 2 J. PUB. L. 250, 251 (1953) ; Barrett, Exclusion of
Evidence Obtained by Illegal Searches, 43 CAL. L. REV. 565, 584-86 (1955). Mr. Justice
Stewart has told us the reason for the lack of empirical statistics: "Since as a practical
matter it is never easy to prove a negative, it is hardly likely that conclusive factual data
could ever be assembled." Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 218 (1960).
339 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961), quoting Elkins v. United States, supra
note 138, at 217.
140 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 652 (1961).
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In doing so, it has properly brought an end to one aspect of an experi-
ment in federalism, and, in doing so, it has probably shifted the legal
battlefield to the fourth amendment's second clause.
It is true that Mapp has solved some very difficult issues previously
inherent in federal-state law enforcement. But by no means is the
decision a panacea simply because it applies the Constitution's exclu-
sionary rule to this area. In fact, it creates a number of problems. The
case is crucial in that it might foreshadow the application of the Bill
of Rights, as a unit, to the states. More specifically, Mapp's reliance on
Boyd's fourth-fifth amendment relationship..' plus Mr. Justice Black's
separate concurrence, indicate that the Court has not yet set at rest
the question whether the self-incrimination provision of the fifth amend-
ment shall be applied to the states. In addition, Mapp certainly dooms
those earlier cases which previously relied on Wolf for their foundation-
stone, particularly does it raise the problem of the continuing validity
of the use of wiretapped evidence in state courts' criminal proceed-
ings.14 2
One of the more immediate problems of Mapp which will confront
our court system is whether its ruling shall be applied retrospectively.
This problem has many hues. 3 At the time of Mapp, half of the states
admitted evidence no matter how it was obtained; the remaining states
had adopted the exclusionary rule either totally or partially. 4 Although
141 "'We find that, as to the Federal Government, the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
and, as to the States, the freedom from unconscionable invasions of privacy and the
freedom from convictions based upon coerced confessions do enjoy an 'intimate relation'
in their perpetuation of 'principles of humanity and civil liberty [secured] ... only after
years of struggle.' ... They express 'supplementing phases of the same constitutional
purpose-to maintain inviolate large areas of personal privacy,' ... that together they
assure in either sphere.., that no man is to be convicted on unconstitutional evidence."
Id. at 656-57.
142 An exploration of all the cases transcends this paper but certainly the following
ones are in doubt: Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952) (the wiretapping counter-
part of Wolf); Pugach v. Dollinger, 365 U.S. 458 (1961), noted in 36 WAsH. L. Rv.
93 (1961) ; Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951). See Note, 60 YALE L. J. 720
(1951). Also continued reliance in Mapp and Elkins on the dissents in Olnstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), throws grave doubt on the majority position there,
and Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953), has been further undermined. Also, the
Plimsoll line of due process-see, Field, Frankfurter I. Concurring, 71 H. v. L. REv. 77
(1957)-has probably been rewritten affecting both Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165
(1952), and Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
".43 The perplexing jurisprudential problem is that of balancing the need for stability
of judicial decisions against the harshness of continued imprisonment after the constitu-
tional interpretation which caused the conviction has been overruled. For discussion of
some constitutional issues see, Stimson, Retroactive Application of Law-A Problem in
Constitutional Law, 38 MIcH. L. Ray. 30 (1939). See also, Comment, Retroactive Effect
of Decision Overruling Previous Interpretation of a Criminal Statute, 34 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 1133 (1959) ; Note, Prospective Operation of Decisions Holding Statutes Uncon-
stitutional or Overruling Prior Decisions, 60 HARv. L. REy. 437 (1947).
144 See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), App., Table I at 224-25.
19611
WVASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
the trend in the states was haltingly towards an adoption of the exclu-
sionary rule,'45 there are no statistics available to indicate the number
of persons currently in jail because unconstitutionally seized evidence
was used at their trial.'46 They must be freed if Mapp applies retro-
spectively, and one can rest assured that federal and state courts are
currently receiving large numbers of petitions for writs of habeas
corpus. How should they rule?
The answer appears to be that Mapp will apply retrospectively.
Primarily, this is so because Mapfi is a constitutional interpretation.
Any solution short of this result would put the Court in the position of
admitting to two constitutional provisions-one applicable to persons
convicted on unconstitutionally seized evidence before the Mapp rule,
and another applying to those convicted after Mapp.
Retroactivity was hinted at by Mr. Justice Clark in the Mapp opinion
when he quoted from Cardozo 47 and then admitted that in some cases
"under our constitutional exclusionary doctrine 'the criminal is to go
free because the constable has blundered.' 14' After anticipating that
the forthcoming petitions for release must respect the state procedural
requirements governing assertion and pursuance of direct and constitu-
tional challenges to criminal prosecutions, he continues in a very signi-
ficant footnote:
We note, moreover, that the class of state convictions possibly affected
by this decision is of relatively narrow compass when compared with
Burns v. Ohio, Griffin v. Illinois, and Herman v. Blaudy. In those cases
the same contention was urged and later proved unfounded. 149 [Cita-
tions omitted.]
The reference to Griffin 50 is particularly enlightening for that case
held that a state's denial of a free transcript required by an indigent
defendant to exercise his right of appeal constituted a denial of equal
protection and due process under the fourteenth amendment. 5' But Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, the fifth vote for the majority, created confusion
145 Washington has long held to the exclusionary rule. See State v. Cyr, 40 Wn.2d
840, 246 P.2d 480 (1952); State v. Gibbons, 118 Wash. 171, 203 Pac. 390 (1922).
Earlier, such evidence was admissible. See State v. Royce, 38 Wash. 111, 80 Pac. 268
(1905).
146 Even though a state may have followed an exclusionary rule, Mapp may apply in
certain situations. See Sisk v. Overlade, 220 F.2d 68 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
876 (1955), and discussion supra beginning at note 87.
147 Then Judge Cardozo, People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926).
'
4
sMapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
1491Id., n.9.
15 Griffin v. Illinois, 357 U.S. 12 (1956).
151 In short, the case reaffirmed a key principle of American law-that of equal justice
for rich or poor. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). See Comment, The Effect of
Overruling Prior Judgmeints on Constitutional Issues, 43 VA. L. REv. 1279 (1957).
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when he stated that there should be no retroactive applications of the
decision. 52 This confusion was set at rest two years later. 5 ' The Court
held that refusal to supply a transcript to an indigent who had requested
it in order to appeal as of right from a 1935 conviction was a denial of
constitutional rights. Two factors emerging from Griffin and Eskridge'54
which may directly affect Court decision regarding retroactive applica-
tions of an overruling case are: fairness to the individual, and the
practical administration of justice. 5 ' A retroactive application of the
Griffin rule was feared to be a setting of the stage for a wholesale release
of criminals. This fear has failed to materialize. Apparently this state
of affairs has had some influence, for it now appears that the Court
thinks that the number of convictions affected by Mapp "is of relatively
narrow compass when compared with... Griffin." 58 If this thinking
continues, then Mapp will probably be applied retrospectively.
Perhaps of more long range importance are questions concerning the
second clause of the fourth amendment which pertains to search war-
rants. ' Does Mapp apply it to the states or signify a trend in that
direction? And, if so, do the configurations of that clause, as particular-
ized by federal precedents, control the states when they grant warrants
or shape rules of search incident to valid arrests? For several reasons
it would appear that the answer will be a qualified yes. 58
First of all, there are the matters of constitutional doctrine and logic.
152 Griffin v. Illinois, supra note 151, at 20. (concurring opinion).
15 sEskridge v. Washington State Board of Prison Terms and Paroles, 357 U.S. 214(1958). But cf., Patterson v. Medberry, 142 Colo. 180, 350 P.2d 571 (1960), cert.
denied, 30 U. S. L. WEEK 3113 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1961).
15' Compare Shioutakon v. District of Columbia, 236 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1956). The
decision may vary with the type of case and whether human liberty or property or eco-
nomic interests are involved. Compare Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442(1886), with Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 374(1940); and note, Great Northern Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Refg. Co., 287 U.S. 358(1932). See, Prospective Operation of Decisions Holding Statutes Unconstitutional or
Overruling Prior Decisions, 60 HARv. L. REv. 437 (1947).
155 These factors divided the Court in its most recent effort. See James v. United
States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961) ; Comment, Effect of Overruling Prior Judgments on Con-
stitutional Issues, 43 VA. L. REv. 1279, 1290-94 (1957).
156 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961), n.9.
157 "... [A]nd no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or things
to be seized." U.S. CoNsT., amend. IV. A full exploration of this question goes well
beyond this article; however, the relation of the two clauses is commented upon in
ANNALS OF CONG. 783 (1789), and a good discussion of issues can be found in Comment,
Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court, 28 U. CHI. L. REv. 664, 67&-706 (1961).
1is The statement need not be guarded as much when we deal with the Washington
situation because the Washington Supreme Court has held that WASH. CONST. art. I,
§ 7--"No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without
authority of law"--is "identical in purpose and substance" to the fourth amendment.
State v. Miles, 29 Wn.2d 921, 926, 190 P2d 740, 743 (1948). See also, State v. Smith,
55 Wn.2d 482, 348 P.2d 417 (1960).
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Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent in Mapp was based on Wolf, and he argued
that only the core of the fourth amendment's first clause was incorpor-
ated into the fourteenth; not the entire first clause itself nor the whole
amendment. 5 ' This position must be considered for it throws light on
the problem. The Wolf opinion dealt, by dicta, with the question
whether the entire Bill of Rights was to be applied, across the board,
to the states.' There, the Court rejected a total approach to the first
eight amendments, and refused to draw the line to include them, recog-
nizing "it is for the Court to draw it by the gradual and emperic process
of 'inclusion and exclusion.' " However, Mr. Justice Harlan neglects
this point. The distinction between a selective approach to the various
amendments and a complete adoption of them is bypassed, and he
cites this part of Wolf for the proposition that only the "core" of the
fourth amendment applies through the fourteenth." 2 Apparently, he
did not deem it necessary to indicate that the "core" concept announced
in Wolf was advanced for the purpose of distinguishing that amend-
ment's "core," i.e., the right to personal privacy and security which was
there deemed "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" and selectively
applicable to the states, from the exclusionary rule which Wolf did not
apply to the states. Furthermore, it had separated the fourth amend-
ment into two clauses. Since Mapp overrules this distinction, it should
be apparent that the fourth amendment's first clause, and perhaps the
entire amendment, as interpreted in Weeks and Boyd, now applies to
the states in its entirety, rather than merely in its "core."
159 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 678-80 (1961). He also ignores another illustration
of the demise of the "core" concept when he fails to recognize one of the additional
premises of Elkins which indicated that if a state search would be unconstitutional if
conducted by federal officials, it is therefore productive of inadmissible evidence when
conducted by state officials. This notion clearly assumes fourth and fourteenth stand-
ards to be identical. "As the Court's rule only purports to exclude evidence seized by
state officers in violation of the Constitution, it is plain that the Court assumes for the
purposes of these cases that, as a consequence of Wolf, precisely the same rules are
applicable in determining whether the conduct of state officials violates the Constitu-
tion as are applicable in determining whether the conduct of federal officials does so ......
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 237 (1960) (Frankfurter dissenting).
160 "The notion that the 'due process of law' guaranteed by the Fourteenth is short-
hand for the first eight amendments of the Constitution and thereby incorporates them
has been rejected by this Court...." Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 26 (1949). See,
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
161 Wolf v. Colorado, supra note 160, at 27.
162 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 679 (1961). It is still possible, of course, to argue
that the security of the person is more important than security of one's papers and
effects. See Barrett, Personal Rights, Property Rights and the Fourth Amendment,
SUPREME COURT REviEw 46 (1960). But to build such a distinction into the amendment
disallowing searches invading a person's physical security but allowing ramblings
through his house would reduce that amendment to a form of words. All police need
do is wait until a person leaves his home, then the search would be valid. This distinc-
tion would encourage lawless law enforcement.
[VOL. 36
THE END OF AN EXPERIMENT
The Court's opinion in Mapp does not deal explicitly with this point,
but the holding was obviously against Mr. Justice Harlan's views. An
additional point which buttresses this conclusion-that the first clause
and perhaps the entire amendment is now part of the fourteenth amend-
ment-lies in the Court's approach to the problem in Mapp. It did not
decide that the exclusionary rule, as a separate and distinct entity, was
required by the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. That
course would have required the Court to determine that the exclusion-
ary rule, standing alone, was one of those rights "basic to a free
society," and hence, "the very essence of ordered liberty."'63 Instead,
.the Court re-analyzed the right to privacy which had already been in-
corporated by Wolf. It found the Weeks and Boyd exclusionary rule
to be an "essential ingredient of that right." Consequently, the "core"
of the fourth amendment of Wolf has now been filled out to its proper
constitutional status in Mapp, at least applying the first clause of that
amendment to the states.16" ' But Boyd and Weeks did not sever the
amendment into two clauses; rather, they viewed it as a whole, and
perhaps Mapp will come to mean that it is a key step in applying the
entire amendment to the states.
Further, since the second clause of the fourth amendment was surely
inserted for the purpose of supplementing the first clause by strictly
regulating, search warrants, the two have been deemed inseparable by
the Constitution. The second clause is a constitutionally supplied in-
strument for achieving the values expressed by, and is therefore a part
of, the right to privacy. Indeed, even if Mr. Justice's Harlan's position
be accepted, it is perhaps the "core" of that amendment as developed in
Boyd and Weeks which the fourth amendment's second clause is truly
a part of and was intended to implement. It would appear logical and
constitutionally necessary to include in the fourteenth, the fourth
amendment's second clause whether one agrees with either Mr. Justice
Harlan or the majority in Mapp.
A final reason which argues for the extension of Mapp to include the
entire fourth amendment, including its precedents, is experience. If
that entire amendment were applied to the states, it would probably
require stricter methods by state police. However, evidence shows that
168 See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). Allen, The Wolf Case, 45
IL. L. Rav. 1, 14-16 (1950).
164 "Since the Fourth Amendment's right to privacy has been declared enforceable
against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable
against them by the same sanction of exclusion as is used against the Federal Govern-
ment." Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). See Kamisar, Wolf and Lstig Ten
Years Later, 43 MiNx. L. Rav. 1083, 1101-08 (1959).
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when stricter requirements have been imposed on the police in a sepa-
rate but related area, they did not necessarily mean a diminution in the
quality of law enforcement. Quite the contrary, the District of Colum-
bia police function under a federal rule which excludes from evidence
all statements taken from a defendant during a period of prolonged
pre-commitment detention, regardless of their voluntariness. 6 ' In
short, the police are denied the right to use secret interrogation methods
to solve crimes. Oliver Gasch, United States Attorney for the District
of Columbia, commenting with pride, indicated that as a result of a
police training program, the District police are assembling much better
cases by carrying out more thorough investigations before arresting
suspects, and further, that reliance on confessions has been minimized
and that there has been no sharp increase in crime because of these
rules.'66
Although constitutional necessity, logic and limited bits of analogous
experience may point in the direction of making all existing fourth
amendment precedents applicable to the states, there are factors to be
considered before so concluding. The first consideration lies in the
Court itself. In a companion case to Mapp, the Court was confronted
with a Missouri statute which, in essence, broadly authorized the
issuance of a search warrant for "obscene" materials but required no
specific description of the things to be seized."' In short, the statute
authorized the issuance of a general search warrant-the very thing
the fourth amendment was designed to prevent. Unanimously, the
Court held the statute unconstitutional, but on first amendment
grounds.'68 It saw the Missouri statute as "an adjunct to a system for
the suppression of objectionable publications."'69 Since the fourth
amendment requires warrants to describe the "things to be seized," the
Court could have disposed of the Missouri statute on that ground alone,
and thereby added a generous measure of clarity to the problem whether
the fourth amendment's second clause is incorporated into the four-
teenth. Indeed, two justices did exactly that.' But the remaining
16-5 See Hogan & Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule, 47 GEO. L. J. 1 (1958).
166 See Hearing on H.R. 11477, S.2970, S.3325 and S.3355 before a sub-cominittee
of the Committee on The Judiciary of United States Senate, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 396-
421 (1958) ; Weisberg, Police Interrogation of Arrested Persons, 52 J. CRier. L., C. &
P. S. 21, 34 (1961).
167 Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961).
168 Id. at 731.
169 Id. at 724.
170 Justices Black and Douglas. Id. at 738.
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seven did not, and the question of entire fourth amendment incorpora-
tion is preserved.
A second reason, giving pause, is the very important one concerning
the law of arrest, effective law enforcement procedures, and civil
liberties. Explanation of this highly complex issue goes well beyond
this article. Therefore, the problem is highlighted only. A reasonable
search made incident to a lawful arrest is constitutional, and evidence
thereby procured is admissible1 11 This result, recognized by the Court,
is an exception to the command of the second clause of the fourth
amendment which allows a search only on a valid warrant. The obvious
problem is that, if the second clause of the fourth amendment were
made applicable to the states, then its exception, namely the reason-
ableness of every search incident to a valid arrest, would probably
become a federal question governed by federal law. In addition, state
rules regarding the reasonableness of arrests would probably come
into question. 2 The Court was hesitant to take this step, at least with-
out full and complete argument on its probable consequences." 3
If the fourth amendment is not to be circumvented, this area will
become the new legal battlefield, replacing Wolf. The Court's future
decisions must outline the modes through which law enforcement
officials might gather evidence. The decisions must merit the respect of
the police and allow effective law enforcement in terms applicable to
today's problems; yet, they must preserve and advance our basic con-
stitutional values if we are to become more humane and civilized.
Resolution of these issues probably could not have been undertaken in
171 See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) ; Abel v. United States 362
U.S. 217 (1960); VARoN, SEARCHES, SEIZURES AND IMMUNITIES 194-216 (1961). In
fact, when the Abel case is combined with Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959),
"one may well conclude that the Fourth Amendment requirement of search upon war-
rant... has been severely restricted as a practical matter and that opportunities for
oppressive search at the hands of zealous agents have been greatly enlarged." 20 LAw.
GUMD REv. 65 (1960).
172 "Of course, a search without warrant incident to an arrest is dependent initially
on a valid arrest." United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
173 These points were not briefed at all in Mapp, and, if argued, they were argued
only tangentially. The same is true of argument on the Wolf case itself. "I think it
fair to say that five members of this Court have simply 'reached out' to overrule Wolf."
Mapp v. Ohio, 376 U.S. 643, 674 (1961) (dissenting opinion). See Brief of Amicus
Curiae, p. 20. Mr. Justice Douglas seeks to answer this charge at 666 (concurring
opinion). Similar to Mr. Justice Harlan is the plaintive plea of Mr. Justice Butler in
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,82 (1938). "No constitutional question was sug-
gested or argued below or here." For discussion of a parade of possible horribles and
a plea to "apply the exclusionary rules to the states only when a serious or intentional
breach of privacy occurs," see Kaplan, Search and Seizure: A No-Man's Land in the
Crininal Law, 49 CAL. L. REv. 474 (1961). He does not set out criteria indicating how
serious a breach would be serious enough to justify applying the rule.
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Mapp. In fact, the Court and scholars alike are currently handicapped
by the inadequacy of our present knowledge about valid police needs,
present police practices, and their subtle and far-reaching effects.
But the Court need not have decided all these issues in Mapp because
present federal precedents appear amply flexible to incorporate most
any approach of merit." 5
The Court ought not delay putting an end to this second aspect of
our experiment in federalism. Should it fail to do so, Mapp v. Ohio will
have been for naught. Suppose a state court admits evidence gathered
in violation of the second clause of the fourth amendment, yet valid and
in keeping with its rules of search incident to a lawful arrest. The basic
dilemma of Wolf appears again, and tolerance of short-cut law enforce-
ment methods would reduce the right to privacy to an empty promise.
"If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law;
it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anar-
chy.' 7 6 As Mr. Justice Clark's opinion indicates, the freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures lies deep in our tradition of liberty.
The Bill of Rights itself expresses human aspirations common to all
mankind and against which time tests its teeth in vain. Its taproot idea
is simply that each individual is uniquely worthwhile. Should the unique
worth of a human being vaporize, then an age of barbarism will begin.
To guard against such dire possibilities, our Constitution provides us
with a federal system, having the Supreme Court as its umpire. 7 Its
current Chief Justice has recognized the heart of the problem, saying
that "our system faces no theoretical dilemma but a single continuous
problem: how to apply to everchanging conditions the never-changing
principles of freedom.' 78 A healthy federalism must avoid needless
conflict among state and federal courts. In this regard, the United
States Supreme Court has a unique duty because ignoble shortcuts to
174 See the welter of material cited in Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 571-606
(1961), but note their lack of description of actual police practices, police needs, the
conditioning factors, etc.
175 This is particularly true in light of United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56
(1950) ; Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960) ; Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360
(1959). See discussion accompanying note 169 supra. See also, Reynard, Freedom From
Unreasonable Search and Seizure-A Second Class Constitutional Right?, 25 ImD. L. J.
259 (1950) ; Grant, Circumventing the Fourth Amendment, 14 So. CAL. L. REV. 359
(1941).
176 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (dissenting opinion).
177 See Freund, Umpiring the Federal System, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 561 (1954);
Schaefer, Federalism, and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1956) ; Frie-
delbaum, The Warren Court and American Federalism-A Preliminary Appraisal, 28
U. CHi. L. REV. 53 (1960).
i8 Warren, The Law and the Future, Fortune, Nov. 1955, p. 107.
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conviction left open to the states destroy our entire system of constitu-
tional restraints on which our fundamental liberties rest. "The need
for vigilence to prevent government from whittling away the rights of
the individual was never greater."' 79 The Court closed a large gap in
Mapp, and consequently, it has taken the first step in ending an ignoble
experiment in federalism.
179 Mr. Justice Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the States, 36 N.YU.L. R v. 761;
776 (1961).
